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COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: A NEW CONCEPT FOR THE
MILLENNIUM, OR THE REDISCOVERY OF THE WHEEL?1
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Abstract: ‘Community of practice’ is a relatively new term for an apparently new
discovery - groups inside workplaces and elsewhere through which individuals learn a
practice, simultaneously developing their own identities, and reproducing the practice.
It has been hailed as significant for understanding organizational learning and
knowledge management.
This paper explores the meanings of the term and some related concepts through the
work of its originators, Lave, and Wenger.  This reveals some hidden tensions and
conceptual gaps, as well as an implicit four-fold categorization of communities of
practice.  Two key problems are highlighted.  First, it is impossible in the context of
organizational studies to distinguish communities of practice from the informal
organization, a phenomenon that has been studied for many years.  Second, the
concept of practice is used in ambiguous and contradictory ways.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The term ‘communities of practice’ was introduced by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger,
and first used extensively in their book Situated learning (Lave & Wenger 1991; see
Lave 1991; Wenger 1998a: xiii).  It has been deployed by others from the Xerox
PARC / Institute of Learning Research group (e.g. Duguid & Brown 1991, Huberman
& Hogg 1994, Brown & Gray 1995) and is seen as a critical novel concept for
understanding organizations, particularly in the context of knowledge management
(Manville 1998, Peters 1998) and has recently been invoked in papers on
organizational learning (Brown & Gray 1995; Brown & Duguid 1998; Fox 1997;
Graham et.al. 1998; Gherardi et.al. 1998; Manville & Foote 1996a,b; Richter 1998;
Stewart 1996; Wenger 1998b).
The object of this paper is to explore the concept focusing on its conceptual status and
potential utility for understanding employing organizations.  It should be noted that
Lave and Wenger’s “central preoccupation” was with a social theory of learning. They
cautioned that the concept of community of practice remained “largely as an intuitive
notion” (1991: 42), and concluded that “in a sense, all that we have said so far is about
access.” (1991: 101).  Nevertheless, they did define the concept, distinguished several
types of community, and described examples from which we can derive an
understanding of their intentions.
2.0 COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE
2.1 Definition
A community of practice is “ ... a set of relations among persons, activity, and world,
over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of
practice.” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 98).  The notion ‘community’ only implied
“participation in an activity system about which participants share understandings
concerning what they are doing and what that means in their lives and for their
communities”, and diversity of participation.  It did not imply “some primordial culture
sharing entity”, absence of conflict, or of differences of interest.  They also added that
it was not necessary for members to be co-present, for the group to be well defined
and identifiable, or for there to be socially visible boundaries (1991: 98).
Wenger emphasised the defining nature of internal processes.  For him communities of
practice are characterized by “collective learning [that] results in practices that reflect
both the pursuit of [their] enterprises and the attendant social relations.” (Wenger
1998a: 45)  They are also “shared histories of learning” (Wenger 1998a: 86; italics in
original). A community of practice is defined by the “mutual engagement” of the
members in a “practice” which “is the source of coherence of a community” and it is
through “mutual engagement”, “joint enterprise”, and “a shared repertoire” (Wenger
1998a: 72-3) produced through negotiation and thus defined by the participants as they
produce both community and practice that a community of practice can be said to exist
(1998a: 78, 84).
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2.2 Practice
Lave and Wenger (1991) noted that “a theory of social practice emphasizes the
relational interdependency of the agent and world, activity, meaning, cognition,
learning, and knowing.” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 50). They linked their work to the
legacy of Marx, Bourdieu, and Giddens, among others but did not present a clear
conceptual framework for understanding ‘practice’.  The term was used
interchangeably with “social practice” “activity”, and “an activity system” (Lave &
Wenger 1991: 35, 55, 98), but none of these terms was discussed further.
Wenger stated that “practice is always social practice” and “connotes doing ...  in a
historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do.” (Wenger
1998a: 47).  He emphasised meaning rather than doing - “Practice is about meaning
as an experience of everyday life”.  Meaning, moreover, is “located in a process I will
call the negotiation of meaning”, which involves “participation and reification”
(Wenger 1998a: 52 - italics in original).  Thus communities of practice “develop
around things that matter to people ... their practices reflect the member’s own
understanding of what is important.” (Wenger 1998b) and a practice should be thought
of as what the members of a community of practice “are there to do” (Wenger 1998a:
74).
An understanding of how Lave and Wenger interpreted the concept can be found by
examining the examples they discussed.  They drew data from five case studies of
apprenticeship among Mayan traditional midwives, Liberian tailors, US Navy
quartermasters, supermarket butchers’ apprentices, and members of alcoholics
anonymous (Lave & Wenger 1991:61-87).  They also referred to a study of
photocopier field service technicians, (Orr 1990, 1996), and Wenger described staff in
a hospital (1996), and the work of insurance claims’ processing clerks (1998a).
The midwives, photocopier technicians, quartermasters, hospital staff, and insurance
clerks all perform what can be categorized as service work, in that it enabled others to
continue their activities, but did not itself result in production of material goods.  The
tailors’ practice centred on the production of garments, and the butchers’ of cuts of
meat: both are material goods, and so these were instances of material production.
It is more difficult to categorize the practice of members of alcoholics anonymous.
This practice transformed and promoted the self-transformation of alcoholics into non-
drinking alcoholics through the mediation of other non-drinking alcoholics (Lave &
Wenger 1991: 79-84).  This can be described as an explicit identity transformation
processes - explicit because identity is produced within any community of practice
(Lave & Wenger 1991) but here it was itself the focus of the practice.  Lave and
Wenger also suggested that the practice high school students was to produce “the
community of schooled adults” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 99), a process also centred on
identity transformation.
In view of the diversity of practice types, it is difficult to see just what a ‘practice’ is
(or is not).  One the one hand Lave and Wenger appear to mean anything done by
people that can be distinguished either by an external observer, or is so distinguished
by the people involved.  As Wenger (1998a: 47) put it, “The concept of practice
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connotes doing ... in a historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to
what we do.”
On the other hand, Lave distinguished “practice[s] ... worthy of the name” (Lave
1991:79) from other implicitly ‘unworthy’ practices.  The former, it would appear, are
to be equated with ‘mastery’ of whatever it is that the community is doing.  The latter,
on the other hand arise when structural constraints on “informal communities” (Lave
1991: 78) prevent such developments.  If what a community of practice does is its
practice, as Wenger appears to emphasize, it is difficult to envisage how such a
practice could be ‘unworthy’. Lave appears implicitly to be setting up some absolute
scale against which communities of practice could be ranked, or perhaps suggesting
that what a community wants to do (but is prevented from doing) is its ‘real’ practice,
but she does not make this clear.
2.3 Varieties of community of practice
The term ‘communities of practice’ is qualified in interesting and suggestive ways
(Lave & Wenger 1991, Lave 1991; but not in Wenger 1998a).  The first notion is that
of “interstitial communities of practice” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 42) of which the study
of photocopier service technicians was an example (Lave & Wenger 1991: 77, 109).
This showed that the technicians’ formal job was to diagnose problems, and repair and
maintain machines at customers’ sites (Orr 1990, 1996).  They received mandatory
training to prepare for work (Orr 1996:156), and were provided with “directive
documentation” for their field work (Orr 1996:105-6).  Orr, however, discovered that
their “real work ... is to maintain a triangular relationship between the technicians, their
customers, and the machines ...” (Orr 1996:66), and that the “technician’s primary goal
is to keep the customer happy ... [which] includes but is not limited to fixing the
machine ... “ (Orr 1996:108).
The technicians also used official resources in ways to suit themselves. The field
manuals’ diagnostic routines did not facilitate learning about the machines because
managers believed the technicians could be replaced by semiskilled labour with a good
set of instructions (Orr 1996:87).  The technicians however subverted the purpose of
the documentation to learn more about how the machines functioned.  This knowledge
supplemented that gained from the “community of knowledge” (Orr 1990:174) that
they developed, independently of managers, within which they freely shared work
knowledge in the form of stories and advice (Orr 1990, 1996, passim).
Orr did not refer to the technicians as a community of practice, or use the term
‘interstitial’ although he was part of the same group of researchers as Lave and
Wenger (Orr 1996: xiii, xv-xvi).  There seem to be two ways in which the technicians’
activities contrasted with those of the other communities of practice Lave and Wenger
described.
First, they had redefined their work in ways unintended by managers, and that were
“institutionally disapproved” (Lave 1991: 79).  Second, they did not follow standard
procedures, and even subverted the manuals’ intended purpose.  Further, they engaged
extensively in story telling that functioned to create and maintain a ‘community of
knowledge’ about their work that existed independently of, and in some respects in
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spite of, the organization that employed them.  Their ‘practice’, as discovered by Orr,
could thus be said to have developed in the ‘gaps’ or interstices that existed between
work as defined, and the range of tasks technicians discovered (or decided) had to be
performed if their formal work was to be done effectively.  They flouted the rules, in
order to get the work done, and were able to do so because of the mismatch between
the rules, and the nature of the work itself.
Lave and Wenger argued that “communities of practice may well develop interstitially
and informally” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 64, 65), thus appearing to equate these terms.
Elsewhere (Lave 1991:78) identifies interstitial with ad hoc communities of practice,
and labelled both “informal communities of practice”.  She contrasted these with
communities of practice that “exist ... in formally defined ways.” (Lave 1991: 78), but
did not provide examples.  Indeed, if we accept that communities define themselves,
(Wenger 1998a: 74; 1998b), it is difficult to see in what sense they could exist
‘formally’.  The term ‘integral’ seems a more descriptive name for non-interstitial
communities of practice, indicating that such communities are in some way ‘part’ of
the larger social structure, unlike interstitial ones, without invoking other connotations
of formality.
The second distinction Lave and Wenger made was between communities of practice
which provided “quite effective forms of learning”, and those that ‘did not work’
(Lave & Wenger 1991: 65).  In order to understand this point, we have to consider
their concept of ‘legitimate peripheral participation’.  Unfortunately the term was used
in several different ways (e.g. Lave & Wenger 1991: 31, 35, 39-41, 55, 110) and
although they insisted that it cannot meaningfully be decomposed, they nevertheless
talked about “peripheral participation”, about people being “legitimately peripheral”, or
being able to “participate legitimately, but not peripherally” (Lave & Wenger 1991:
104).
Despite these conceptual ambiguities the thrust of their argument is clear.  Legitimate
peripheral participation is a socialization process through which newcomers are
‘legitimately’ associated with a community, initially only in a ‘peripheral’ manner
which nevertheless allows them to ‘participate’ in real community practice.  Thus
novice mid-wives accompany experienced ones, run errands for them connected with
childbirth, and so on.  Newcomers eventually ‘move’ from periphery to centre,
becoming old-timers in the process.  This process is essential for learning and the
reproduction of the community of practice, and “requires access to a wide range of
ongoing activity, old-timers, and other members of the community; and to information,
resources, and opportunities for participation” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 100).
Thus a properly functioning community of practice facilitates the legitimate peripheral
participation of all its members, and thereby enables learning, and the reproduction of
both identities, and practice (Lave & Wenger 1991: 55, 77-9).  Opportunities for “full
participation” create “possibilities for identities of mastery” through learning (Lave &
Wenger 1991: 42, 53, 115).  The midwives, tailors, navigators and alcoholics
anonymous cases provide examples of effective communities of practice.
A non-functioning community of practice is the mirror image of the former.
Possibilities of attaining full participation, and thus ‘mastery’ are denied or inhibited.
The butchers’ apprentices were kept on routine jobs, out of all contact with the master
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butchers from which they could at least have seen what mastery entailed.  These
apprentices “participate legitimately” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 104) but lacked
peripherality.  On the other hand, “[s]choolchildren are legitimately peripheral, but
kept from participation in the social world more generally (Lave & Wenger 1991:104).
A fourfold typology of communities of practice is clearly implicit in their discussion.
First, we have integral communities of practice which are effective in promoting
learning: the tailors, navigators, and alcoholics anonymous members.  Second are those
communities which are also effective, but which are interstitial. The photocopier
technicians were a prime example of this type, as were Wenger’s (1998a) insurance
clerks, and the midwives (their practices were maintained in the face of prescriptions of
best practice by Government officials (Jordan 1989, reported in Brown & Duguid
1991)).  The butchers’ apprentices were an integral but ineffective community of
practice.  No interstitial ineffective communities were described in this literature.
Lave & Wenger (1991) and Lave (1991) also indicated some of the conditions under
which legitimate peripheral participation might be ‘distorted’, and thus functioning
integral communities of practice could fail to develop.  The factors they identified can
be divided into two groups - those external to and those internal to the community of
practice, although there may be some overlap in their effects.
Factors external to the community of practice included “coercive workplaces” (Lave &
Wenger 1991:64); where the “exchange of labor for opportunities to become part of a
community of mature practice” occurred, or where there was “commoditization of
labor” (Lave & Wenger 1991:76; Lave 1991: 65).  Interstitial communities of practice
developed under such conditions “through resistance to the prescriptions of the
ostensibly primary organizational form.” (Lave & Wenger 1991: 64).  They felt these
“structural constraints ... may curtail or extinguish apprentices’ access to the full range
of activities of the job … ” (Lave & Wenger 1991:85-6), and that under such
conditions only the “sociocultural practice of whatever informal community takes place
in response to coercion” would be learned (Lave & Wenger 1991: 64, 42).
“[L]egitimate access to ... a practice ... worthy of the name” (Lave 1991: 78-9) would
be rare for interstitial communities.  In effect Lave argued that integral/successful
communities of practice could not exist under capitalist relations of production.  There,
“negative identities and misrecognized or institutionally disapproved interstitial
communities of practice.” (Lave 1991: 79) would emerge.
The process of legitimate peripheral participation could also be distorted independently
by factors internal to the community of practice.  Thus where old-timers ‘haze’
newcomers (Lave & Wenger 1991: 76), or “masters prevent learning by acting …  as
pedagogical authoritarians … ” rather than facilitating newcomers’ learning (Lave &
Wenger 1991:76) learning does not occur.  Similar problems arise, implicitly, where
there are adversarial relations with “masters, bosses, or managers; exhausting
overinvolvement in work; or in involuntary servitude” since the prospects for and
nature of participation are constrained under such circumstances (Lave & Wenger
1991:64).
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3.0 DISCUSSION
3.1 The ‘discovery’ of informal workplace groups
There seems to be a consensus that Lave, Wenger and Orr have drawn attention to a
novel aspect of work and working.  Thus Brown & Duguid (1991) contrast
communities of practice with group theory, represented by Hackman (1990) and
conclude “Group theory in general focuses on groups as canonical, bounded entities
that lie within an organization and that are organized or at least sanctioned by that
organization and its view of tasks” (Brown & Duguid 1991).  Communities of
practice, by comparison, are non-canonical, and not recognized by the organization.
The concept of a community of practice has also been held to provide a new
conceptual tool for enabling the study of “occupational dynamics in situations that lack
the institutional supports that sociologists normally attribute to recognizable
occupations.” (Barley 1996).  Nelsen contrasts communities of practice with
occupations, asserting that “communities of practice span occupational ... boundaries
to include a variety of actors - providing they share the same worldview.”, and claims
that an emergency medical team comprising medical technicians, firefighters, rescue
workers, police, physicians, nurses and so on constitutes a community of practice
(Nelsen 1997: 155).
Wenger asserts that a community of practice is “not a synonym for group, team, or
network.” (1998a: 74).  He sees membership of groups as “a matter of affiliation” in
which “identity is a matter of social categories”, but provides neither authority,
argument nor evidence to support his conclusion.  In communities of practice,
however, he claims that “Membership ... is a matter of participation and learning, and
identity involves ways of relating to the world.” (Wenger 1998a: 283).  Further,
networks “merely [define] who knows whom” (1998a: 74).   Thus in an organizational
context, communities of practice are distinct from business or functional units in that
they define themselves in practice; from teams because these are defined by the task;
and from networks which are “just a set of relationships” (Wenger 1998b).  His case
for the phenomenological distinctiveness of ‘communities of practice’ is asserted rather
than argued.
None of these authors appear to be aware of the extensive if diverse and dispersed
research on informal groups in organizations, with the partial exception of Orr (1996:
151-2). This omission is surprising as some of the Xerox PARC researchers did equate
communities of practice with informal organizational groups (Huberman & Hogg,
1994).  Savoie (1993) reminds us that the distinction between de jure and de facto
dates back to Roman times, and more recently the phenomenon was described as so
commonplace in organizational studies that documentation hardly seemed necessary
(Zimmerman 1971).  This is not the place to begin a new review of this work (see e.g.
Hodson 1997, Rose 1988, Savoie 1993, Salaman, 1986) but reminder of its scope is
pertinent.
We can begin with a report of consultation and collaboration among colleagues in a
US Government audit department originally reported by Blau in 1955 (Blau 1974).
Formally, the auditors worked independently of each other, and were supposed to
consult their supervisor if they had problems; they were expressly prohibited from
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consulting each other.  Nevertheless, Blau discovered that agents habitually consulted
a small number of relatively experienced colleagues either directly, or through lunch-
break story telling.  Blau concluded:
The practice of consulting co-workers, directly or in disguised form, ...
transformed an aggregate of individuals who happened to have the same
supervisor into a cohesive group.  The recurrent experience of being dependent
on the group, whose members furnished needed help, and of being appreciated
by the others in the group, ... , created strong mutual bonds. ... Social cohesion,
in turn, contributed to operations in a variety of ways. (Blau 1974: 166-7)
We can also refer in this context to Trist and Bamforth’s (1951) discovery of the
“responsible autonomy” exercised by self-organizing teams of coal miners, and Strauss
et.al.’s (1963) identification of ‘negotiated order’ as the means by which concerted
action is obtained and maintained between individuals and groups in an organization.
Groups also manage work life in ways to suit themselves as Wenger (1998a) noted of
the insurance claims’ processors.  Burawoy (1979), Roy (1952, 1953), and
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) provide classic accounts of ‘making out’ under
piecework payment systems.  Here, workers’ ingenuity is often exercised to obtain the
maximum pay for minimum effort.  This is generally done in a collective manner, with
understandings over acceptable levels of effort established and maintained by the
group.  Thus workers establish and maintain maximum levels of work turned in during
any time period; work hard on easy jobs to build up a ‘bank’ of effort credit to be
called on when faced with jobs on which it was impossible to ‘make out’ - achieve a
reasonable level of output or earnings; apply their skill to devising and deploying
methods of achieving acceptable output using methods not officially recognized (but
which give them some advantage), and so on.
Making out can be treated as a game (Burawoy 1979), but industrial workers also
literally play games, filling out ‘spaces’ in work time that were not or could not be
prescribed (Katz 1968).  At the Hawthorne plant, observers noted a number of
different games that the men engaged in during work breaks or production
interruptions.  As is well known, they identified two separate groups of players,
involving different grades of worker, in the same small unit (Roethlisberger & Dickson
1939:500-501).  Roy (1960) also described a variety of games and non-work related
storytelling among a small group of factory workers.
Games can also merge into ‘sabotage’ (Brown 1977), which itself has degrees of
significance for worker and manager.  As a vacation cleaner in a light engineering
factory, one ‘game’ I observed involved running machines too fast so that large
quantities of oil would flood out of the reservoirs onto the floor.  This produced a
period of respite from the monotony of machine minding while the cleaners scurried
around (but not too fast) making the floor safe again.
Games can be seen as functional but they are quite distinct from the behaviour of
groups like the audit agents, photocopier technicians, or those engaged in ‘making
out’, since the activities were explicitly non-work directed.  Autonomous group
centred behaviour or practices at work extend even further in what can be seen as the
direction of stealing / reclaiming time from the employer.  Batstone et.al. in Shop
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Stewards in Action (1977) provide a detailed portrait of shop floor union organizing
activity showing how issues regarded as important to their members were raised,
assessed, and evaluated, and how activists manage relations among themselves, and
with their members.  All this self-managed activity was, like that of Lave and Wenger’s
alcoholics anonymous members, for themselves, and clearly conducted in the
‘interstices’ (some officially recognized) of the formal organization to which they
‘belonged’.
Even further removed (from a managerial perspective) along this scale is workplace
theft.  Mars (1982) described how workers in various jobs engaged in group devised
and sanctioned methods of ‘fiddling’.  These groups operated in ways identical to
those described by Orr (1996) or Blau (1964), but worked for themselves, not ‘for’ the
employing organization.  Outright sabotage is of course even further removed along
this scale, but is also socially ordered, as numerous studies of working class
development have shown (e.g. Brown, 1977, Thompson, 1968).
Before considering the implications of these cases, are they ‘communities of practice’
in the sense intended by Lave, Wenger, and other authors?  Blau’s auditors clearly
formed an interstitial community of practice comparable with the photocopier
technicians, but what of the other examples?  Whether they are real ‘communities of
practice’ might depend on what is meant by ‘practice’ - an issue discussed in the next
section.  On the assumption that a practice is what the people doing it do (Wenger
1998a: 74, 1998b) then colleagues co-operating to bend the rules in order to get work
done, to manage the work-effort bargain to their advantage, to play games, organize to
identify and promote their own interests at work, or to engage in community
sanctioned acts of sabotage, all form ‘communities of practice’.
From this perspective, it is clear that ‘communities of practice’ have been known about
and studied for many years.  Their presence is implicit in Taylor’s contrast of scientific
management with what it was intended to replace (Taylor 1911, 1947).  In 19th
Century Britain, if not elsewhere in Europe, the term “co-operative work” was used to
describe work performed by autonomous work groups (Schloss, 1898).  The history of
employee self-organization is of course also well known and studied.
In the context of organizational theory and behaviour, and studies of work,
‘communities of practice’ are known better as informal groups, or the informal
organization, or through the notion of industrial sub-culture or organizational culture
(Gray & Starke, 1988; Buchanan & Huczynski, 1985; Turner 1971).  While some of
the ‘community of practice’ literature emphasises aspects of informal group
functioning that have previously gone unremarked, there seems no advantage in
inventing a new term to describe a familiar if neglected aspect of organizational life.
It is also evident from this brief review that informal groups’ activities cover a far
wider spectrum than noted by ‘community of practice’ authors.  Despite their concern
to provide a situated, historical, account of learning Lave & Wenger only focus on one
of the many practices (in particular on ‘work’) that engaged members of their
communities of practice.  A truly situated account of their practice would require us to
take other practices into account.
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3.2 The notion of ‘practice’
There are two issues arising in connection with how ‘practice’ was applied by
‘communities of practice’ authors.  The first concerns the identification of ‘practice’
with ‘work’, and the second the distinction between ‘worthy’ and other practices.
Four of Lave & Wenger’s (1991) communities of practice performed tasks valued by
others outside the community - midwifery, garment manufacture, navigation, and meat
preparation.  So did Wenger’s (1998a) insurance claims clerks, the photocopier
technicians (Orr 1996), engineers at National Semiconductor (Brown & Gray, 1995),
medical practitioners and other staff (Wenger 1996), and emergency medical teams
(Nelsen 1997).  A case could also be made for regarding alcoholics anonymous
members as producing a socially valued service but they are also distinct in that their
practice explicitly concerns self-transformation.  For the other groups, such
transformations only happen as a by-product of practices that produce social values.
If a practice necessarily involves the production of social values then the term could be
reserved for such groupings, and those examples of practice centred more ‘narrowly’
on group values excluded from consideration.  To do so, however, would lead to
debate about whose values should be taken as the standard, and preclude us from
accepting a community’s own definition of its practice.  If, however, this latter
perspective is accepted, then ‘making out’, playing games, shop steward and union
activities, and ‘fiddling’ must be regarded as valid practices.  (They certainly provide
instances of participatory learning, of transition from periphery to ‘centre’, of identity
formation, of special language and behaviours, as all the references cited above show).
The term ‘community of practice’ must therefore include such groupings.  We are then
back to the position that there is little or nothing to distinguish a ‘community of
practice’ from an informal group, at least in the context of employing organizations.
The second issue also concerns values, this time for or of the community itself.  As we
have seen, Lave (1991:78-9) asserted that ‘interstitial’ communities of practice rarely
get access to ‘worthy’ practices, defined implicitly in terms of ‘mastery’, and by
contrast with the examples of the midwives, tailors, navigators, and alcoholics
anonymous members.  The practices to which novice midwives and tailors can aspire
to grow into are clearly akin to craft work and skill, and this appears to be what Lave
in particular means by ‘worthy practice’, at least in a work context (see especially Lave
1991).
The Navy navigators were also included in Lave and Wenger’s list of integral
communities of practice, but it is unclear how can we think of them as engaged in a
‘worthy practice’ since they only contributed a small part, and one defined by designers
of naval work, in the running of the ship.  Conversely, why is the photocopier
technicians’ practice not ‘worthy’; and what might constitute a worthy practice for
them, or for anyone working where there is a marked division of labour?
It seems that the distinction between ‘worthy’ practices, and those that only belong to
the informal community itself is based on external (observer) values.  The imposition of
particular values in this way might be justified from the perspective of a humanistic
concern with learning (Lave 1991).  In the context of work, her concern is reminiscent
of early discussion about the nature of skill in the labour process debate (e.g.
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Braverman 1974), or the concerns of job enrichment proponents (Buchanan &
Huczynski 1985).  But making value judgements about a practice does not help in the
identification and analysis of communities of practice.
If the concept of ‘practice’ is to be used, and it is to mean something more than just
‘what people do’, then it seems preferable to identify practices in terms of what an
informal group actually does, rather than make difficult and perhaps indefensible
distinctions between ‘worthy’ and other practices.  Further, the concept appears to
require more substantive theoretical definition or at least explication than Lave or
Wenger provided.  Perhaps the work of Harris (1980; and see Reed 1985) would be
relevant here.
4.0 BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION
Space precludes discussion of other problematic issues such as the conflation of
learning with living; claims about identity formation in groups and organizations; the
failure to ‘situate’ ‘communities of practice’ in their larger context; the distinctiveness
of ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ in the context of oranizational socialization
theories; and, the issue of special workplace language.
The concept of ‘communities of practice’ lacks conceptual clarify, and does not add to
knowledge about organizational functioning.  Its use is likely to lead us to believe it is
a new discovery, and to ignore the wealth of knowledge we have on informal and
autonomous work groups in organizations, and work group psychology.  In much of
the ‘communities of practice’ literature we appear simply to be dealing with a
rediscovery of ‘human factors’, and of many established if neglected ideas that do
appear to be very relevant to organizational learning, and knowledge management.
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